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BOOK REVIEWS 385 
NOTES 
1. See Jerome Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief 
(Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1997), and Mystical Experience of God, a 
Philosophical Enquiry (London: Ashgate Publishers, 2001). 
Value and the Good Life by Thomas 1. Carson. Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2000. Pp. xii, 328. 
PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame 
This book is divided into three parts. In the first, Carson subjects several 
theories of value to critical examination and tries to show that many argu-
ments for or against them rest on answers to metaethical questions. The 
second part is devoted to discussion of these meta ethical questions and 
concludes with a defense of a preference-satisfaction conception of non-
instrumental value. In the third part, Carson argues that the most plausi-
ble preference-satisfaction theory is, if a deity of a certain sort exists, a 
divine-preference theory. 
The first part of the book consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 recon-
structs and criticizes the arguments in Mill's Utilitarianism and Sidgwick's 
The Methods of Ethics for hedonistic theories of value. Chapter 2 discusses 
several familiar objections to hedonistic theories of value. Carson takes 
these objections to show that many rational and well-informed people 
have preferences inconsistent with hedonism. He argues that proponents 
of hedonism must hold that such preferences are incorrect and so are com-
mitted to endorsing axiological realism. Chapter 3 is devoted to prefer-
ence-satisfaction theories of value. Carson argues that the most plausible 
versions of such theories hold that what is non-instrumentally good is 
determined by the preferences we would have if we were rational. He 
goes on to defend such theories against a variety of objections, including 
particularly interesting objections by Richard Kraut, Richard Brandt and 
Charles Taylor. Chapter 4 argues that Nietzsche's ilbermensch ideal consti-
tutes a distinctive theory of value. Carson tries to show that Nietzsche's 
theory of the will to power would, if true, strongly support this theory of 
value, but he concludes that Nietzsche has not adequately explained or 
defended his theory of the will to power. Chapter 5 criticizes Aristotle's 
theory of the good life, and it also argues against the Aristotelian theories 
of value proposed by Peter Geach and Thomas Hurka. A brief interlude 
following Chapter 5, whose purpose is to motivate the move to the next 
part of the book, reminds readers that arguments previously examined, for 
example, the defense of hedonism based on the claim that conflicting ratio-
nal preferences are mistaken, rest on metaethical positions such as axiolog-
ical realism that have yet to be scrutinized. 
There are just two chapters in the second part of the book. Chapter 6 
focuses on the concept of non-instrumental value. Carson defends prag-
matic criteria for choice of a concept of value according to which it is a con-
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ceptual truth that being non-instrumentally good implies being worthy of 
preference or correctly preferred. Chapter 7 argues against axiological 
realism, which Carson takes to be the view that judgments about non-
instrumental goodness or badness are true or false in virtue of facts inde-
pendent of actual or hypothetical beliefs, attitudes, emotions or preferences 
of rational beings. He argues that none of the currently prominent ver-
sions of axiological realism is worthy of our acceptance. The chief targets 
of his criticism are the so-called "Cornell Realists," among whom he 
includes Richard Boyd, David Brink and Nicholas Sturgeon, and the 
"British Realists," among whom he includes Susan Hurley, John McDowell 
and Mark Platts. Another brief interlude builds on material from these 
two chapters to argue that, if axiological realism is false and some things 
are non-instrumentally good or bad, then they are good or bad, at least in 
part, in virtue of the fact that it is rational and hence correct to prefer them. 
The third part of the book contains only Chapter 8. In it Carson tries to 
determine what kind of theory of rationality is best suited for use in a ratio-
nal-preference-satisfaction theory of value. He argues that full-information 
theories of human rationality are untenable because of human limitations. 
He next formulates an informed-preference theory of human rationality 
that does not require full infom1ation and so escapes the main objections to 
full-information theories, and he then formulates and defends a divine-pref-
erence theory of rationality. He argues that his divine-preference theory is 
the best theory to use in a rational-preference-satisfaction theory of value if 
a deity of the sort it describes exists. And he also argues that, if such a deity 
does not exist, his informed-preference theory is a suitable backup. 
I think this is a very good book. It deserves praise on account of its 
many philosophical virtues. Carson has original and stimulating ideas on 
almost every issue he takes up; he even has something fresh to say about 
such old chestnuts as Mill's argument for hedonism. His arguments are 
always carefully crafted, and he seldom claims more for them than they 
actually deliver. His prose style is plain, simple and clear. He takes bold 
stands on controversial topics and defends them vigorously. Of course, 
precisely because he does this, the book presents a large target to critics. 
There is more in it with which I am inclined to disagree than I can even 
mention within the confines of a fairly short review. Since I imagine that 
its divine-preference theory will be of special interest to many readers of 
this journal, I shall devote the remainder of the space available to me to 
scrutinizing it. 
I need to make explicit some of the details of that theory before I can 
explain why I am unwilling to accept it. A couple of the principles on 
which it rests serve as premises of the argument of the book's second inter-
lude. One is this: "A necessary condition of something's being non-instru-
mentally good (bad) is that it is correct (fitting, appropriate) to prefer that it 
exist/occur (not exist/occur), other things being equal" (p. 216). It is 
important to keep in mind that the principle does not assert that correct-
ness is sufficient for goodness. It leaves open, as Carson notes, the possibil-
ity that nothing is good. Combining the other two premises of the argu-
ment yields the following principle: If axiological realism is false, then 
"preferences can be said to be correct or incorrect in virtue of being rational 
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or irrational" and "there is no other way in which preferences can (plausi-
bly) be regarded as correct or incorrect" (p. 216). Let us assume henceforth 
that axiological realism is false. Given this assumption, Carson's general 
view is that rationality determines correctness, and correch1ess is a neces-
sary condition of non-instmmental goodness. 
Whose rationality? One advantage of a divine-preference theory of 
rationality is that the preferences of an omniscient deity will satisfy the 
conditions of full-information theories of rationality. It will not do, howev-
er, to appeal to the preferences of an omniscient but supremely malicious 
deity, and so Carson borrows an idea from the twice modified divine com-
mand theory of wrongness once proposed by Robert M. Adams in order to 
formulate a preliminary version of his own theory. It says this: "If there 
exists a loving and omniscient God who created the universe and human 
beings for certain purposes / reasons, then God's preferences are the ulti-
mate standard for the correctness/rationality of human preferences" (p. 
242). According to Carson, if such a deity does not exist, the correctness of 
human preferences is to be determined in some other way. And he makes 
it clear that, if such a deity exists, the correctness of human preferences is 
determined by the deity's preferences concerning those human preferences 
by endorsing the following principle: "If a loving and omniscient creator of 
the universe prefers that person S have a certain preference (p) (or if a lov-
ing omniscient creator of the universe would prefer that Shave p if such a 
God existed), then it is rational (correct) for S to have p" (p. 244). 
But Carson is not satisfied with the preliminary formulation of his theory. 
After surveying some accounts of love, including those of Anders Nygren 
and Gene Outka, he concludes it is likely that any plausible concept of love 
presupposes independent notions of good and bad. Since he is assuming the 
falsity of axiological realism, he views it as improper for him to employ the 
concept of a loving deity in formulating his theory. So he revises it by build-
ing into the description of its deity only characteristics he takes to be without 
axiological presuppositions. We are to assume that the deity cares deeply 
about human beings. By this, Carson means that the deity "regards us as a 
very important part of creation" and "has an intrinsic, or non-instrumental, 
concern for us" (p. 249). We are also to suppose that the deity is kind, sym-
pathetic and unselfish. By this, he means that the deity "is distressed by our 
suffering and pleased by our pleasure" and "is inclined to remove our suf-
fering" and "ordains suffering for our sake, i.e., for the sake of its effect on us" 
(pp.249-250). The final version of Carson's theory may thus be stated as fol-
lows: "If there is an omniscient God who designed and created the universe 
and human beings for certain purposes/reasons, cares deeply about human 
beings, and is kind, sympathetic, and unselfish (in the ways explained 
above), then God's preferences are the ultimate standard for the correct-
ness/rationality of human preferences and for the goodness or badness of 
things. (If such a God exists, it is rational (correct) for person S to have a cer-
tain preference (p) if, and only if, God prefers that Shave p)" (p. 250). Let us 
henceforth suppose that a deity of the sort described in the antecedent of the 
theory'S first conditional does exist. 
As Carson points out, this deity's preferences might conflict with the 
preferences it prefers some humans to have. Let X be Nixon's ceasing to be 
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president in 1974 and Y be Nixon's continuing as president through 1976. 
Carson says: "It is conceivable that God prefers X to Y, but also prefers that 
Nixon's wife and daughters prefer Y to X" (p. 245). In such a case, there 
are, so to speak, two routes from divine preferences to the state of affairs of 
Nixon's ceasing to be president in 1974, one direct and the other indirect. 
By which of these routes, if either, is the goodness or badness of that state 
of affairs determined? If determination goes by the direct route, it is good 
because the deity prefers that it obtain. If determination goes by the indi-
rect route, it is bad because Nixon's wife and daughters prefer that it not 
obtain and do so correctly in virtue of the deity's preference that they do 
so. Either route is consistent with Carson's theory, since in either case the 
deity's preferences are the ultimate standard for its goodness or badness. 
Is it a good state of affairs or is it bad? Carson does not say. But once we 
ask this question, we open a Pandora's box of troublesome questions. 
Let us explore some of them using an important religious example. 
Consider the story of the akcdah, the binding of Isaac, recounted in Genesis 
22. Suppose that all along the deity prefers Abraham's not killing Isaac, 
since eventually the deity sends an angel to tell Abraham to stay his hand. 
Suppose too that for a while the deity prefers that Abraham prefer 
Abraham's killing Isaac, because the deity commands Abraham to do so. 
Focus on the period between the time the command was given and the 
time it was withdrawn. What does Carson's theory tell us about the good-
ness or badness of the state of affairs of Abraham's killing Isaac during that 
period? One possibility is nihilistic. Since the theory does not assert that 
correct preferences are sufficient for goodness or badness, it might be that 
Abraham's killing Isaac is neither good nor bad. Another possibility is rel-
ativistic. When Carson considers the possibility that his deity might prefer 
that I prefer that X exists and also prefer that you prefer that X not exist, he 
allows that proponents of his theory "could say that it's true for me that X 
is non-instrumentally good and true for you that X is non-instrumentally 
bad" (p. 258). Similarly, proponents of his theory could say that it is true 
for the deity that Abraham's killing Isaac is bad and true for Abraham that 
Abraham's killing Isaac is good. And even if we set these two possibilities 
aside, there remain the two possibilities already discussed in connection 
with the Nixon example. Perhaps Abraham's killing Isaac is bad because 
the deity prefers that Abraham not kill Isaac. Or perhaps Abraham's 
killing Isaac is good because Abraham prefers it and does so correctly in 
virtue of the deity's preference for this preference. Can we eliminate either 
of these possibilities? 
It might be thought that the latter should be dismissed because the 
deity's direct preferences trump in such cases of conflict. However, 
Carson's theory by itself fails to secure for us this easy way out. I have so 
far said nothing about the correctness of the deity's preferences. According 
to the parenthetical sentence in the final formulation of Carson's theory, 
the deity's preferences are correct just in case the deity prefers having or 
reflectively endorses them. So suppose the deity prefers having the prefer-
ence for Abraham to prefer killing Isaac. It follows that the deity's prefer-
ence for Abraham's preference is correct. But Carson allows that the deity 
may not reflectively endorse all its own preferences. He says: "God might 
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suffer from weakness of will; God may have desires God prefers not to 
have and is unable to control" (p. 253). So suppose the deity, believing it 
can resurrect Isaac, prefers not to have its preference for Abraham's not 
killing Isaac. It follows that the deity's preference for Abraham's not 
killing Isaac is incorrect. And it is very implausible at best to imagine that 
an incorrect divine preference trumps a human preference whose correct-
ness is grounded in a correct divine preference. 
Carson does not rule out the possibility of an infinite regress of divine 
preferences. As he sees it, "the possibility of an infinite regress of higher-
order preferences cannot be dismissed in the case of an omniscient being" 
(pp.253-254). So suppose there is an infinite regress of divine preferences 
that starts with the deity's preference for Abraham's preference for killing 
Isaac and is such that each preference in the regress endorses its predeces-
sor. And suppose too there is an infinite regress of divine preferences that 
starts with the deity's preference for not having its own preference for 
Abraham's not killing Isaac and is such that each preference in the regress 
endorses its predecessor. It remains highly implausible to imagine that the 
deity's first-order preference for Abraham's not killing Isaac trumps. 
It is worth noting in passing that the deity's higher-order preference 
may have an impact on the relativistic possibility that was set aside earlier. 
Given that the deity's second-order preference not to have it renders its 
first-order preference for Abraham's not killing Isaac incorrect, it is also 
implausible to imagine that it is true for the deity that Abraham's not 
killing Isaac is good. 
It might be objected that puzzles about the akedah should not be regard-
ed as a serious problem for Carson's theory because it is very special case 
and has perplexed commentators for millennia. But Carson's theory does 
not guarantee that cases of this sort are rare. Maybe Carson's deity, being 
non-instrumentally concerned for human beings, prefers that they have 
any preferences they form as a result of reasonably conscientious inquiry 
and yet, being omniscient, often has conflicting direct preferences. In other 
words, it may turn out that conflicting divine and human preferences of 
the sort I have pointed to in my treatment of the case of the akedah are very 
numerous. It may therefore be that there are ever so many cases in which 
Carson's theory, even when its nihilistic and relativistic possibilities are 
ignored, does not give us a determinate answer about what is good or bad 
unless we have fairly elaborate knowledge of the psychology of its deity 
and, in particular, of its higher-order preferences. 
Where does that leave Carson? I think he is hoist with his own petard. 
His criticism of Cornell realism focuses on Sturgeon's claim that indepen-
dent moral facts enter into the best explanations we can give of certain 
human beliefs and behaviors. Carson's response is that at present we 
know so little about human psychology that claims about the form best 
explanations will take are merely conjectural. He concludes that "the work 
of Cornell realists justifies a research program to try to construct a (moral 
realist) theory of human psychology, but we cannot assume in advance 
that this research program will succeed" (p. 202). If we grant him this 
point, surely we are entitled to press a similar point about his proposal for 
a divine-preference theory of rationality. At best it justifies a research pro-
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gram to try to work out an account of the psychology of the sort of deity 
whose existence it depends on, including all its higher-order preferences, 
but we cannot assume in advance that this research program will succeed. 
And there is a salient difference between the two cases. We do understand 
how a research program in human psychology with moral realist ideas in 
its hardcore might progress or degenerate. It is, however, difficult to imag-
ine how a research program in divine psychology that would deliver the 
goods Carson needs could ever be anything more than sheer speculation. 
Nature, Design and Science: The Status of Design in Natural Science by Del 
Ratzsch, State University of New York Press, 2001, x + 220, $40.00. 
PATRICK RICHMOND, St Catharine's College, Cambridge 
This book aims, not to address the question of whether the natural 
world is designed, but rather whether science is in principle able to accom-
modate the concept of supernatural design. 
Ratzsch develops the definition of design and relates it to anthropology 
and the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence, before analysing the con-
cept of supernatural design. He then investigates where the true bound-
aries of scientific legitimacy lie. He concludes that standard attempts to 
rule out design in principle fail and that there might be potential scientific 
pay-offs in allowing the possibility of supernatural design. 
Ratzsch takes design to be the result of deliberate agent activity inten-
tionally aimed at generating particular patterns. Pattern is to be under-
stood in terms of structures that have special affinities to cognition. 
Design results in artefacts that can usually be recognised because they 
exhibit 'counterflow,' marks of agent activity, features which mindless 
natural processes would not produce. Ratzsch argues that science is quite 
capable of recognising artefacts. For example, the search for extra-terres-
trial intelligence (SET!) is the search for energy artefacts. Thus science 
could legitimately investigate the theory that aliens intentionally pro-
duced life on earth. 
Ratzsch then investigates supernatural design. He notes that a supernat-
ural being could intentionally produce artefacts identical to those pro-
duced by finite, natural agents. Additionally, supernatural beings could act 
in ways that break natural laws. They could affect quantum probabilities, 
as well as create things from nothing, including natural laws, constants 
and primordial initial conditions. A complicating factor is that if an agent 
creates an element of nature itself then there is no possibility of comparison 
with what nature does unaffected by intentional agency. Supernatural cre-
ation may therefore not show the primary marks of agent activity and 
counterflow usually associated with the artefacts of finite agency and so 
may be harder to identify. 
Ratzsch argues that complexity and improbability alone are not strong 
evidence of design (a random set of craters on the Moon might be highly 
complex and improbable but not suggest design). However, complexity 
